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Overcoming Hurdles in the Enforceability
of Make-Whole Provisions
BRIAN PATRICK MCBRIDE*
There have been recent conflicting decisions in U.S. district courts of New York, Delaware, and others states regarding to the enforceability of make-whole provisions in
bankruptcy. The ambiguity created by the courts’ decisions
has caused uncertainty for all parties involved in these kinds
of loan documents. This comment is an analysis of the enforceability of make-whole provisions in the context of bankruptcy in light of the recent decisions. In order for a makewhole or a no-call provision to be upheld, a number of hurdles must be cleared. The provisions must be valid under
both state law and bankruptcy law. Make-whole provisions
are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy under state
law to the extent that they are not true penalties under a liquidated damages analysis. Once bankruptcy comes into
play, the provisions must withstand a number of hurdles. In
order to be enforceable in bankruptcy, a make-whole provision must be a valid liquidated damages claim under state
law, it must be provided for and triggered under the contractual agreement, and it must not be tantamount to unmatured
interest.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to balance the
interest of creditors, both secured and unsecured, and debtors in an
equitable manner.1 These competing interests in bankruptcy often
put secured creditors in a detrimental position because the bankruptcy court is trying to reach an equitable distribution for all.2 One
of the ways a secured creditor’s position can be impacted negatively
is by the disallowance of defeasance fees.3 In instances where disallowance occurs, value is being reallocated from secured creditors
and given to unsecured creditors.
Bond indentures and credit agreements often have provisions
that limit the ability of a debtor to repay its debt before maturity.
One type of provision, termed a no-call, does not allow for prepayment of a loan,4 while other types of provisions permit prepayment
as long as the debtor agrees to pay a prepayment fee.5 Prepayment
1
See Scary Nightmares For Secured Lenders, Presented at the 18th Annual
American Bankruptcy Institute Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop, 246 (Jul. 18–
21, 2013), http://materials.abi.org/sites/default/files/2013/Jul/ScaryNightmares
.pdf [hereinafter Scary Nightmares].
2
Id.
3
Id. at 263 (“Defeasance fees are prepayment penalties intended to compensate a secured creditor for the bargained-for interest it loses when a debtor pays
the principal due prior to the loan’s maturity date.”).
4
Scott K. Charles & Emil A. Kleinhaus, Prepayment Clauses in Bankruptcy,
15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2007).
5
Id. at 537.
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fee type provisions have been commonly referred to as make-whole
provisions. Defeasance fees are supposed to compensate lenders for
the loss of expected interest payments when the debtor pays the principal prior to the maturity date.6 The fees are calculated in two different ways: some are based on yield maintenance formulas, and
others are based on a fixed percentage of the amount being prepaid.7
Make-whole premiums help determine the rights of the borrower
and the lender if the borrower decides to prepay the loan.8 A rational
borrower will repay a loan when the transaction costs are lower than
the amount of savings that a new loan will generate.9 In other words,
debtors may seek to refinance their loans when interest rates drop.
By replacing a high interest rate loan with a low interest rate loan,
debtors can create savings. This is costly to the original lender because they will lose the expected stream of higher interest payments.
Therefore, savvy lenders will want to make sure that if interest rates
go down, their yields are protected.10 Most lenders will have factored the borrower’s interest payments into their future cash flow
analysis.11 It is pertinent that courts clarify the enforceability of defeasance fees before rising interest rates diminish the issues pertaining to make-whole premiums.12
Prepayment premiums are generally enforceable outside of
bankruptcy under state law to the extent that they are not true penalties under a liquidated damages analysis. In addition to undergoing
a liquidated damages analysis under state law, the provision must be
triggered under the loan agreement in order to be enforceable. The
issue is more complicated if the debtor seeks to refinance its debt in
bankruptcy. Once in bankruptcy, state law continues to apply, but
there are additional hurdles that the Bankruptcy Code imposes. First,

6

Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 263.
Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 538.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See id. (“Prepayment clauses, in sum, allow a lender to negotiate for yield
protection and a borrower to negotiate for freedom of action.”).
7

11

Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 264.
See G. Ray Warner, Make Whole Premiums and Unmatured Interest, GT
RESTRUCTURING REVIEW (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.gtlaw-restructuringreview.com/2014/09/make-whole-premiums-and-unmatured-interest/.
12
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the Code provides that a secured creditor is entitled to interest on its
claim and “any reasonable fees, costs, or other charges provided for
under the agreement,” to the extent the secured creditor is oversecured.13 This is not a large hurdle to clear because lenders can easily
provide for make-whole provisions in their agreements. However,
there is a question of whether the make-whole provision is reasonable. Second, the Code provides that a creditor’s claim cannot include
“unmatured interest.”14 The third limitation is that there must in fact
be a pre-payment.15 If the bankruptcy filing itself accelerated the
loan, any plan that would subsequently refinance the indebtedness
would then be a payment, not a prepayment.
The Code provides that “[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured
by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in
the estate’s interest in such property.”16 Thus, a prepayment penalty
may be allowed under bankruptcy law only to the extent the value
of the secured creditor’s collateral exceeds its claim and the loan
agreement provides for a prepayment penalty. Section 502 permits
a claim unless, among other things, it amounts to a payment for unmatured interest.17 Therefore, even if the value of the collateral exceeds the claim and the provision is triggered under the loan agreement, a prepayment penalty will not be enforceable if a court renders
the provision tantamount to unmatured interest.
The third complication with the Code is that loan agreements
frequently provide that the filing of bankruptcy is an event of default
that automatically accelerates the debt.18 Acceleration makes the
loan due immediately, i.e., it accelerates the loan’s maturity. So if
bankruptcy accelerates the loan, this raises the question of whether
refinancing after acceleration qualifies as a prepayment.

13
14
15
16
17
18

11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2012).
Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 546.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2012).
Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 546.
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If a lender purposely accelerates debt, either inside or outside of
bankruptcy, courts have held that the lender has waived their contractual rights to prepayment fees.19 Courts have held this because,
upon acceleration, the debt has matured. This maturation of the debt
means that any subsequent payment can no longer be seen as a prepayment.20 Also, most prepayment provisions are only enforceable
if the debtor takes the “option” to prepay.21
Generally, make-whole provisions are enforceable under state
law when the debtor is outside of bankruptcy.22 Once the debtor is
in bankruptcy, the court’s analysis should begin by determining
whether the agreement covers prepayment penalties and, if so, (1)
whether that provision is an unenforceable penalty and (2) whether
that provision has been triggered. If the provision is a valid liquidated damages clause and it has been triggered under the loan document, then the court should consider whether or not the provision
should be disallowed as unmatured interest. Courts are split on
whether make-whole provisions are allowable as liquidated damages in bankruptcy or disallowable as unmatured interest.23 All of
these positions presuppose that a prepayment clause is still applicable after the automatic acceleration of a debt.24
No-call provisions are generally unenforceable in bankruptcy
because they violate the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of reorganization
by allowing the creditor to contract around it.25 However, whether
or not damages may be collected for the breach of a no-call is another story. No-call provisions simply memorialize the common law

19

Id. at 547.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, The Story of YMPS
(“Yield Maintenance Premiums”) in Bankruptcy, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
449, 450–51 (Spring 2005).
20

23

Matthew I. Knepper, Lipstick on a Pig: Disallowing Make-Whole Clauses
as Unmatured Interest, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 40, 40–41 (Dec. 2013) (noting
that the characterization of make-wholes as allowable liquidated damages claims
is the current majority position.).
24
Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 556.
25
Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 264.
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default rule of “perfect tender in time.”26 Although this rule has been
highly criticized, it remains the law in some states and does not allow for prepayment of a loan unless the contract allows for it.27
Make-whole premiums effectively contract out of the default rule
and allow prepayment as long as the premium is paid.28
There are important questions of whether make-whole provisions are beneficial overall. When a make-whole provision is enforced in bankruptcy, a creditor is given a larger claim against the
estate, which diverts money away from unsecured creditors. If
make-whole provisions are enforced, this effectively allows two private parties, the lender and the borrower, to contract around a public
law. A finely drafted lending agreement may be able to displace the
Bankruptcy Code in determining the distribution of the estate.
This Comment will discuss these larger policy issues created by
the enforcement of make-whole provisions. This Comment focuses
on cases where the effect of the automatic acceleration due to a
bankruptcy filing is not contemplated in the loan document. There
have been recent conflicting decisions in U.S. district courts of New
York, Delaware, and others states regarding to the enforceability of
defeasance fees in bankruptcy. The ambiguity created by the courts’
decisions has caused uncertainty for all parties involved in these
kinds of loan documents. The goal of this Comment is to analyze
when these provisions should be enforceable. In order for a makewhole or a no-call provision to be upheld, a number of hurdles must
be cleared. The provisions must be valid under both state law and
bankruptcy law. Part II of this Comment will address whether or not
these provisions should be deemed valid liquidated damages clauses
under the governing state law. Part II of this Comment will also address situations where the creditor is oversecured, and whether or
not the provision must pass the reasonableness test under section
506(b) of the Code. Part III of this Comment will address whether
or not the plain language of the loan documents provides for defeasance fees in the given circumstances. Part IV of this Comment will
26

Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 540–41 (explaining that a debtor
does not have the right to pay off a loan before maturity in the absence of a contract term to the contrary).
27
Id. at 541.
28
Id. at 543.
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address whether or not these types of provisions violate the Code’s
prohibition on unmatured interest. Part V of this Comment will address situations where the debtor is solvent and how this changes the
analysis. Finally, Part VI of this Comment will address the implications of these rulings going forward and important policy considerations. Part VII will conclude the Comment.
I. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER STATE LAW
The first inquiry in the enforceability of make-whole provisions
is whether the provision is enforceable as a valid liquidated damage
claim under state law. Bankruptcy courts have differed on the
method by which to calculate liquidated damages, but courts agree
that a liquidated damages analysis should be applied.29 Some courts
have held that the prepayment premium must reflect actual damages
that have been incurred in order to be a valid liquidated damages
clause.30 Other courts have held that parties should be free to contract, under a liquidated damages clause, for whatever amount based
on a calculation they deem reasonable as long as it is not inequitable
and unconscionable.31 The freedom of contract line of thought argues that it should not matter whether or not the prepayment clause
is related to the actual amount of damages incurred.32 Most courts
will only construe a prepayment clause as a liquidated damages provision if the loan document says that the provision should be construed that way or the lender successfully makes that argument in
court.33
In School Specialty, the court stated that under New York state
law, a prepayment premium will be enforceable as liquidated damages when “(i) actual damages are difficult to determine, and (ii) the
sum stipulated is not ‘plainly disproportionate’ to the possible
loss.”34 The reasonableness of the damages is determined at the time
29

See John C. Murray, Prepayment Premiums: A Bankruptcy Court Analysis
of Reasonableness and Liquidated Damages, 105 COM. L.J. 217 (2000).
30
Id. at 223.
31
Id. at 227–28.
32
Id. at 228.
33
But see In re Hidden Lake Ltd. P’ship, 247 B.R. 722, 726 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2000); Id. at 235.
34
In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *2 (Bankr. D.
Del. Apr. 22, 2013).
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the agreement was formed.35 The court also said that when determining whether or not the loss is “plainly disproportionate,” it will
consider “(i) whether the prepayment fee is calculated so that the
lender will receive its bargained-for yield, and (ii) whether the prepayment fee is the result of an arms-length transaction between represented sophisticated parties.”36 Generally, courts like the one in
School Specialty will uphold yield maintenance type make-whole
provisions as valid liquidated damages.37 Courts will also generally
reject make-wholes with minimum charge provisions that result in
automatic premiums.38
Some courts have applied state liquidated damages analyses and
found the prepayment provisions were penalties. In Skyler Ridge,
the court found that the prepayment provision was a penalty because
the yield was tied to certain U.S. treasury instruments, and this was
not the appropriate way to calculate the premium.39 The Court said
that the rate should have been that of a comparable first mortgage
market rate.40 Also, the lender failed to convert the difference in the
interest rates to present value.41 The court went on to hold that the
provision was unenforceable under section 506(b) for the same reasons it was unenforceable under Kansas state law.42 Because the parties agreed to treat the make-whole provision as liquidated damages,
the court conceded that there was no need for the court to question
this characterization.43 Because these cases found the prepayment
provisions unenforceable under state law, the court did not have
35

Id.
Id. at *3 (citing In re Vanderveer Estates Holdings, Inc., 283 B.R. 122, 130
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
37
Jeffrey H. Davidson, No-Call and Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy,
SV036 ALI-ABA 497, 501 (May 1–2, 2014).
38
Id.
39
In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); see also In
re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1000–02 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding
that the prepayment premium was an unenforceable penalty under state law and
unreasonable under section 506(b) because the contractual formula would have
charged an amount equal to 25% of the principle. Also, the court was concerned
that paying this premium would leave nothing for the other creditors).
40
Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 505.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 507.
43
Id. at 504.
36
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much opportunity to consider their effectiveness under section
506(b).44
In AJ Lane & Co., the court held that the Bankruptcy Code alone
is the test for whether or not the provisions should be enforced and
used common law to fill in the reasonableness standard.45 Here, the
prepayment provision was a fixed percentage of the amount outstanding.46 The court found that the provision did not approximate
anticipated or actual damages because interest rates had actually
risen and the lender benefited from the prepayment.47 The court also
found that damages were not difficult to prove.48 This case is a good
example of the large assumptions some courts make about lenders
being able to determine the market rate and other variables when
trying to approximate damages.49
Other courts have found provisions enforceable under state law
regardless of whether they reflect actual damages or overcompensate the lender. In Hidden Lake, the court held that the yield-maintenance make-whole provision was enforceable as a liquidated damages clause.50 Hidden Lake, the debtor, procured a loan from Atena,
the creditor, to finance a large apartment building.51 Multiple times
over the course of the agreement, the debtor attempted to modify the
prepayment clause to no avail.52 Before the maturity date, the debtor
defaulted and the lender accelerated the loan, which subsequently
led to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.53 Even though the loan document did not provide that the premium be construed as a liquidated
damages claim, the court held it to be anyway.54 While the court
44

Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 560.
In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 113 B.R. 821, 823–25 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990);
Murray, supra note 29, at 225; Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 560–61.
46
A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 822–23 (noting that the make-whole provision was
based on a formula that took the amount prepaid times one percent (1%) times the
number of years or portions thereof expressed as a fraction remaining on term of
the Loan).
47
Id. at 829.
48
Id. at 829–30.
49
Murray, supra note 29, at 226.
50
Id. at 218.
51
In re Hidden Lake Ltd. P’ship, 247 B.R. 722, 724–25 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2000).
52
Id. at 725–26.
53
Id. at 726.
54
Id.
45
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acknowledged that the premium would overcompensate the lender
and take away unencumbered assets from the pool, it ultimately upheld the provision because sophisticated parties made a reasonable
estimation of the damages at the time the contract was made.55 The
debtor argued that the clause was not a liquidated damages provision
because the premium was not sufficiently uncertain under Ohio
law.56 The court found that “[t]here are significant variables which
make the exact calculation of potential losses from prepayment difficult to calculate.”57 The Hidden Lakes decision did not address
whether or not the premium needed to be reasonable under 506(b).
This decision comports with earlier case law that is discussed below.
A. Reasonableness Test Under Code Section 506(b)
In situations where the creditor is oversecured, courts are split
on whether or not the provision must also pass a reasonableness test
under section 506(b) of the Code in addition to a liquidated damages
analysis. Prepayment premiums must be valid under both state law
and bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy courts in various jurisdictions have
struggled with how a liquidated damages analysis should be performed, and whether the premium must be reasonable under section
506(b).58 Section 506(b) of the Code allows for an oversecured creditor, up to the value of the collateral, to collect interest on the claim
and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges that are provided for in
the loan documents.59 If the premium is characterized as interest or
as a reasonable fee or charge, the premium should be enforceable.60
Prepayment fees are usually characterized as “charges” or “fees”
under section 506(b), which makes them subject to a reasonableness
test.61 Courts have interpreted the relationship between a state law
55

Id. at 728–29.
Richard F. Casher, Prepayment Premiums: Hidden Lake is a Hidden Gem,
19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 32 (Nov. 2000).
57
Hidden Lake, 247 B.R. at 726–27 (explaining the difficulty in determining
the loan amount, the term remaining, the interest rate available, and whether a
suitable reinvestment vehicle will be available).
58
Murray, supra note 29, at 221.
59
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012).
60
Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 557.
61
Scary Nightmares, supra note 1, at 265; Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note
4, at 557.
56
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liquidated damages analysis and a reasonableness test under section
506(b) in different ways. Some courts have held that the provision
must pass both tests.62 These courts have reasoned that section
506(b) simply adds a reasonableness requirement to section
502(b)(1)’s requirement that “the validity of claims be determined
according to non-bankruptcy law.”63 Other courts have held that if a
defeasance fee is valid under state law, then it is reasonable under
section 506(b).64 This second interpretation equates the two analyses. Others see the liquidated damages analysis as a “guidepost” in
determining reasonableness.65
In Foertsch, the court stated that “an oversecured creditor in
bankruptcy has ‘a perfected security interest’ in the equity cushion
afforded by the value of the collateral which secures its claim.”66
The court held that in order to recover fees, charges, or costs, a creditor must establish “(1) that it is oversecured in excess of the amount
requested; (2) that the amount requested is reasonable; and (3) that
the agreement giving rise to the claim provides for recovery of the
fee, cost or charge requested.”67
The interaction between state liquidated damages and section
506(b) remains one of the least tested theories regarding makewhole provisions.68 In GMX Resources, the court held that premiums that resulted from an automatic acceleration due to a bankruptcy filing were not subject to a reasonableness test.69 The court
based its holding on the grounds that section 506(b) only applies to
post-petition fees, charges, and costs.70 School Specialty held that a

62

Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 558.
Id.
64
Id. at 558–59.
65
Id. at 559.
66
In re Foertsch, 167 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1994).
67
Id. at 562; Murray, supra note 29, at 217.
68
Davidson, supra note 37, at 503.
69
Id.
70
See In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *4
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (stating that the majority view is that 506(b) does
not apply to interest, costs, or charges that accrue prior to the bankruptcy filing);
Davidson, supra note 37, at 503.
63
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make-whole provision that is reasonable under state law is also reasonable under the Code.71
Some courts have held that the prepayment premium must reflect actual damages that have been incurred. In Coronado Partners,
the court held that the state law allowed for the liquidated damages
claim, but section 506(b) limits the damages to the actual damages
incurred.72 In order to determine the actual damages, the court calculated “the difference between the contract rate and the market rate
from the date of prepayment until the date of maturity.”73
In Kroh Brothers, the court also invalidated the prepayment provision because it improperly failed to approximate actual damages.74
The court went on to say that section 506(b) only applies to actual
damages, independent of state law considerations.75 In Duralite
Truck Body, the court held that a prepayment fee based on a specific
formula76 did not effectively represent actual damages and was
therefore unenforceable under a liquidated damages analysis and
section 506(b).77 The court explained that if the prepayment fee did
not estimate actual damages, then the charge would either result in
a windfall to the lender or a penalty to the borrower.78
Cases that found prepayment provisions enforceable under state
law were able to examine section 506(b) in more depth. In Financial
Center Associates, the court held that a prepayment fee using a discount rate tied to U.S. treasury bonds that resulted in a fee of 25%
of the value of the loan was enforceable under state law and section
506(b).79 The debtor argued that the fee was not commensurate with
71

In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125, 2013 WL 1838513, *5 (Bankr. D.
Del. Apr. 22, 2013).
72
In re Imperial Coronado Partners, Ltd., 96 B.R. 997, 1001 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1989).
73
Id. at 1001; see Murray, supra note 29, at 224–25.
74
In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997, 1000–02 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
75
Id. at 1002.
76
In re Duralite Truck Body & Container Corp., 153 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1993); Murray, supra note 29, at 224 (calculating the formula was based
on the average total interest earned on the loan, multiplied by the remaining number of months until maturity, and then divided by two).
77
Duralite Truck Body, 153 B.R. at 714–15.
78
Id.
79
In re Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of East Meadow, 140 B.R. 829, 839 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992); Charles & Kleinhaus, supra note 4, at 561.
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actual damages.80 However, the court rejected this argument and
disagreed with the reasoning in Skyler Ridge and Kroh Brothers.81
The court reasoned that damages are not easily proven because
“many unknown factors” are present in determining actual damages.82 The court noted that hindsight should not be used in determination of the reasonableness of the damages.83 With regard to section 506(b), the court stated that “at best we are willing to view the
‘reasonable’ standard of section 506(b) in the context of pre-payment clauses as a safety valve which must be used cautiously and
sparingly as all discretionary powers that are not subject to close
scrutiny and statutory standard.”84
In Anchor Resolution, the debtor conceded that the prepayment
premium was enforceable under state law, but contested that the provision must also be reasonable under the Code.85 The court held that
the formula for the premium was reasonable because unlike other
cases that had a fixed rate of interest, here, the formula “accounts
for changes in the Treasury rate, decreases over time, and has no
‘minimum charge.’”86 The court found the premium reasonable for
the formula used and the amount as a percentage of the principle.87
B. The Interaction Between Liquidated Damages and 506(b)
Most courts agree that the first step in determining whether a
make-whole provision is enforceable is to apply a liquidated damages analysis under state law.88 Under section 502(b)(1), claims
should be determined by applicable non-bankruptcy law, i.e., state
liquidated damages. Courts should not hold that parties are only entitled to actual damages under a liquidated damages analysis because there are many uncertain variables that make it difficult to ascertain actual damages at the time the agreement was made. Also,
80

Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of East Meadow, 140 B.R. at 835–36.
Id. at 837.
82
Id. at 836.
83
Id. at 837.
84
Id. at 839 (The court noted that it is possible that a clause is valid under
state law and not under the Code because it is extremely unjust to the estate).
85
In re Anchor Resolution Corp., 221 B.R. 330, 341 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998);
Murray, supra note 29, at 228.
86
Anchor Resolution Corp., 221 B.R. at 341.
87
Id.
88
See supra Part I.
81
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damages should not be limited to actual damages when represented
and sophisticated parties negotiated these agreements. This clash
among courts between actual damages and the negotiated agreement
illustrates that two goals of contract law, inside and outside of bankruptcy, are in conflict. These two goals are compensation for losses
suffered and freedom of contract.89
The reasoning in Skyler Ridge and AJ Lane makes numerous assumptions about the ability of a lender to take the money from the
prepaid loan and reinvest it into a similar transaction with a similar
yield.90 These presuppositions assume low transaction costs, which
may not be the case. The reasoning also assumes that determining
actual damages at the time an agreement is made is quite simple. In
reality, it is not simple at all. The courts in Hidden Lakes and Financial Associates found that there were many variables that were difficult to ascertain, such as the amount of interest lost on the prepaid
loan; the costs and delays of obtaining a similar loan with another
borrower; the applicable rate of return; the risk involved with the
new loan; the extent and realizability of the collateral; and other uncertainties.91 As the court noted in Financial Associates, “[t]he mere
need for a formula, and the existence of different formulas used by
different lenders show that the actual loss to be incurred may be difficult to determine.”92 Because of the impossibility of accurately
predicting most variables in these types of loan agreements, courts
should allow lenders to collect on prepayment fees regardless of
whether they are representative of actual damages. Courts should
not use the clarity of hindsight to interpret whether something was
reasonable in calculating anticipated damages at the time of contracting. Parties to these types of agreements should be aware of the
consequences of prepaying a loan even if the prepayment premiums
end up being much larger than actual damages to the lender.
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The court’s reasoning in Financial Associates and Hidden Lakes
is most appropriate regarding the interaction between state liquidated damages and section 506(b). Liquidated damages provisions
are necessary because it is hard to determine actual damages from
large loans at the time the agreement was made. It is also most appropriate that make-whole provisions must separately pass a liquidated damages analysis under state law and the 506(b) reasonableness test. The Code seems to be a slightly stricter examination of the
provisions on top of the liquated damages analysis. This conclusion
comports with a distinction proffered by one court that just because
a provision is enforceable under state law, does not mean it is reasonable under section 506(b).93 Unless the provision is extremely
inequitable, courts should leave the parties contractual relationships
as intact as possible.94 Sophisticated lenders specifically bargained
for their interest and courts should not be disallowing it. However,
courts should be entitled to reduce an inequitable claim by lessening
the amount of a make-whole provision because the main goal of
bankruptcy is equitable reorganization.
When lenders make loan agreements containing make-whole
provisions, they should be aware that yield maintenance formulas
are upheld more often because they are actually attempting to approximate damages. Courts will look at agreements that provide for
a fixed fee or a percentage of the outstanding amount with greater
scrutiny because such clauses do not attempt to approximate damages. However, yield maintenance formulas are more likely to be
struck down as unmatured interest.95
II. PLAIN MEANING INTERPRETATION
Courts have analyzed the plain meaning of contractual provisions to determine if make-whole and no-call provisions were triggered under a specific agreement. If a defeasance fee was not triggered under the agreement, a discussion of its enforceability is null

93
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Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 22, at 478.
See In re Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of East Meadow, 140 B.R. at 839.
See infra Part III.
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and void. As discussed in Part II,96 the provision must also be enforceable under a state law liquidated damages analysis. AMR Corp.,
School Specialty, and GMX Resources illustrate that courts will allow or disallow make-whole provisions based on whether or not
contracts have been finely drafted to be triggered under the given
circumstances.97
Additionally, there are questions of whether filing for bankruptcy affects the maturity date of the loan agreement. Courts have
concluded under section 502(b)(1)98 that filing for bankruptcy will
accelerate the principle amount of all claims against the debtor.99
Loan agreements can also provide that filing for bankruptcy is an
event of default that accelerates the maturity date.100 These situations implicate the larger policy question of whether acceleration of
the loan should be determined by the Code or by private contract. If
the prepayment provisions are no longer applicable because the payment is no longer prepayment, then there is no reason to go deeper
into the analysis. The lender can provide in the loan documents that
a prepayment fee is due as long as the loan’s original maturity has
not passed.101 As long as the loan’s original maturity has not passed,
the lender will likely be able to collect the prepayment premium inside or outside of bankruptcy.102 The reason for acceleration provisions in loan agreements is to avoid any problems with the automatic
stay that bankruptcy imposes.103 In other words, the question is,
even if the clause is a valid liquidated damages clause, has the bankruptcy filing triggered that clause?

96

See supra Part I.
John F. Ventola & Sean M. Monahan, Caution: Make-Whole Provisions
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In AMR Corp., the court held that the make-whole provision was
unenforceable because the contract only provided for a premium if
the prepayment was voluntary.104 American Airlines (“AMR
Corp.”) voluntarily declared bankruptcy.105 However, according to
the plain text of the contract, no make-whole premium was due upon
automatic acceleration due to a bankruptcy default.106
U.S. Bank was the holder of certain notes stemming from a series of three transactions with AMR Corp.107 The contract between
the two parties clearly stated that a make-whole premium will be
due in the event of a voluntary redemption, but a premium will not
be due in the event of a mandatory redemption.108 U.S. Bank argued
that AMR Corp.’s debt payment plan was properly construed as a
voluntary prepayment and therefore subject to a make-whole premium.109 U.S. Bank also argued that it did not choose to accelerate
the debt as a remedy, which would make the payment a prepayment
and trigger the prepayment premium.110 In addition, U.S. Bank argued that these provisions were unenforceable ipso facto clauses.111
Lastly, U.S. Bank argued that they should have been allowed to
waive the acceleration of the debt or waive the event of the default.112 When the bankruptcy court denied all of U.S. Bank’s arguments, it appealed directly to the Second Circuit.113
The Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that a voluntary petition for bankruptcy was an event of default under the contract provisions and that this default automatically accelerated the
debt (this was according to Section 4.02(a)(i) of the indenture).114
While the loan trustee had the option of accelerating in the event of
other types of default, this was not the case with acceleration under

104
U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 730 F.3d
88, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2013).
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a voluntary petition.115 U.S. Bank made the previously illustrated
arguments attempting to refute the court’s finding, but they were to
no avail.116
The Second Circuit agreed with AMR Corp. that this was a postmaturity date repayment of an accelerated debt, instead of a prepayment, which would not trigger a make-whole premium under the
contract.117 The court also held that this did not violate section
365(e) of the Code because it was not an executory contract, and a
deacceleration of the debt would violate the automatic stay because
it would modify the contractual rights of the parties.118
In School Specialty, the make-whole provision was enforced because sophisticated parties bargained for a premium to be paid due
to an automatic acceleration of the loan.119 School Specialty Inc.
and a few affiliated companies entered into a credit loan agreement
with Bayside for an aggregate principle amount of 70 million.120 Under the credit loan agreement, the debtors were liable for a makewhole fee for prepayment or acceleration of the loan.121 New York
law governed this loan document.122 The court determined that the
provision was an enforceable liquidated damages clause because
precedent supported the use of an interest rate tied to treasury bills
as the basis for the premium.123
The committee argued that the provisions must also pass the section 506(b) reasonableness standard.124 The court held that the premium was reasonable because it was not plainly disproportionate to
the lender’s probable loss.125 The court did not actually say whether
or not the standard even applied.126 The creditor’s committee also
argued that the premium should be disallowed as unmatured interest
115
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117
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because the payment was intended to compensate for lost future interest.127 The court held, in agreement with the majority of other
courts, that the claim was not unmatured interest because the loan
was fully matured under the contract due to the acceleration.128
In GMX Resources, the indenture clearly provided for a makewhole premium upon automatic acceleration due to bankruptcy.129
The creditor’s committee argued that it was a penalty, but the court
held the provision was a permissible claim for liquidated damages.130 Similar arguments to the ones in School Specialty were
made and rejected by the court.131 In a recent bench ruling in MPM
Silicones, the court held there was no unambiguous clause that made
the make-whole premium due upon acceleration.132 Section 6.02 of
the agreement stated “the principle of, premium, if any, and interest
on the notes shall ipso facto become and be immediately due and
payable.”133 The court held that this was not specific enough for the
make-whole to be triggered by acceleration.134
A. Finely Drafted Agreements Are Key
The courts in all of these cases looked to the plain meaning of
the contract. While this sounds rather simple, the key to interpretation lies in whether the agreement requires a premium for post-acceleration repayment or only pre-maturity prepayment.135 In AMR
Corp., the agreement only provided for a make-whole premium
upon prepayment.136 Therefore, the court held that no premium was
triggered by the automatic acceleration due to the bankruptcy filing.
127

Id.
Id. at *5 (citing Skyler Ridge for the proposition that prepayment premiums
mature at the time of the breach and do not represent unmatured interest).
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In GMX Resources and School Specialty, the parties contracted
for a make-whole premium in the event of prepayment or automatic
acceleration.138 In both cases, the court upheld the make-whole provisions. Bankruptcy courts seem hesitant to enforce make-whole
provisions that are not clearly spelled out in the contract.139 Many
bankruptcy courts will look for reasons to disallow make-whole provisions in order to keep assets unencumbered for other creditors.140
Drafters need to be acutely aware of this going forward.
When sophisticated lenders are fighting in bankruptcy, it is good
policy for the court to give the lender nothing more than what it bargained for in order to protect other creditors. Sophisticated lenders
should receive their bargained for exchange, but only to the extent
that it is specifically included in the plain meaning of the contractual
agreement. Lenders need to be aware of what they are putting in
their contracts and whether or not it will hold up in court. It seems
likely that these types of lenders will learn their lesson from AMR
Corp. and begin to include make-whole provisions that are triggered
by either prepayment or acceleration due to bankruptcy. Finely
drafted loan agreements will prevent lenders’ make-whole provisions from being disallowed due to ambiguities in the contract.
Therefore, whether or not the prepayment premium has been triggered should become a non-issue in most cases.
III. UNMATURED INTEREST UNDER SECTION 502(B)(2)
A final question is whether the make whole provision—even if
a valid liquidated damages clause that was triggered in the bankruptcy—is impermissible “unmatured interest” under Section 502.
Section 502 says a claim is allowed unless, among other things, it
amounts to a payment for unmatured interest. Most courts have held
that make-whole provisions are not subject to the Code’s prohibition
on unmatured interest. However, some courts and scholars believe
that the majority view is just a way to get around section

137
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140
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502(b)(2).141 Whether the lender is oversecured or undersecured is
crucial to the analysis. The timing of the default and acceleration is
also a key factor to be considered.
Section 502(a) of the Code states that a claim or interest, which
is properly filed under section 501, is allowed, unless a party in interest objects.142 Generally, claims are allowed, unless a party in interest can point to an exception under section 502(b). Section
502(b)(1) of the Code states “such claim is unenforceable against
the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent
or unmatured.”143 Section 502(b)(2) states “such claim is for unmatured interest.”144 Section 502(b)(2) is an exception to otherwise allowable claims that gives the party in interest the ability to object to
a claim for unmatured interest.145 Section 506(b) of the Code allows
for an oversecured creditor, up to the value of the collateral, to collect interest on the claim and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
that are provided for in the loan documents.146 Therefore, if a prepayment fee is considered unmatured interest, then it is not allowed
under section 502. And if the claim is not allowed under section 502,
then it is not a secured claim under section 506.147 For purposes of
this Comment, it is assumed that section 506(b) precludes post-petition claims of interest and reasonable fees and charges to everyone
excluding oversecured creditors.148
The biggest problem in the overall enforceability of make-whole
provisions in bankruptcy is the interaction between liquidated damages and unmatured interest. The more the prepayment penalty is
calculated as lost interest payments (actual damages), the more
likely it will be enforceable under state law.149 However, the more
the prepayment penalty looks like unmatured interest, the less likely
it will be enforceable under section 502(b)(2).
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
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Some scholars argue that sections 502(b)(2) and 506(b) must be
read in conjunction with each other.150 When doing so, these scholars argue it becomes clear that the Code only wanted the oversecured
creditor to be able to accrue post-petition interest.151 The Supreme
Court held in United Savings Association of Texas that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to lost interest.152 Section 506(b) provides for an exception to section 502(b)(2) for oversecured creditors
if the agreement allows for reasonable fees, costs, or charges.153 The
majority view is that section 502(b)(1) acts to accelerate all debts at
the petition date.154 Even though a claim may be unmatured before
the filing, the bankruptcy petition has matured the debt.155
The minority view is that although the unmatured claim is allowable under section 502(b)(1), the nine prohibitions are cumulative, and section 502(b)(2) clearly does not allow for unmatured interest.156 These scholars view section 502(b)(2) as a specific prohibition to section 502(b)(1)’s general allowance of a claim for a
make-whole provision for undersecured creditors.157 When a debtor
cannot even pay all the principle amounts of its debt, it would be
inequitable to allow certain creditors to deplete the pool of assets by
collecting interest.158 Once bankruptcy is filed, the Code displaces
state law. In the context of make-whole provisions, these scholars
argue that the bargained for premiums can be disallowed when it
cuts against section 502(b)(2)’s prohibition on unmatured interest159.
Courts that hold prepayment clauses are not unmatured interest
base their holdings on the view that everything has matured pursuant
to the terms of the contract.160 If everything has matured pursuant to
150
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the contract, then nothing is still unmatured when the right to payment of the loan in full has been triggered.161 Therefore, section
502(b) doesn’t apply even though the premium is essentially equal
to the present value of the remaining interest payments.162 It is much
easier to invalidate a yield maintenance formula as unmatured interest as compared to a fixed fee because a fixed fee looks nothing like
unmatured interest.163 The analysis is made easier if acceleration
happens before the bankruptcy petition. In Hidden Lake, Aetna argued that the prepayment fee is matured, is not interest, and is part
of its claim.164 The court held that this claim is not for unmatured
interest because the charge matured at the time the debt was accelerated.165 It did not matter that the premium was, in essence, for the
estimated interest.166 However, the court did note that result might
be different if there had been no prepetition acceleration.167
The minority view holds that make-wholes are just an attempt to
collect a loss in interest income and that is exactly what 502(b)(2) is
attempting to stop.168 In Ridgewood Apartments, the court disallowed a make-whole provision as a claim for unmatured interest because the claim was for contingent interest that was not matured at
the time of the bankruptcy filing.169 The lender, Fannie Mae, accelerated the debt prior to the debtor voluntarily filing for bankruptcy.170 The contract stated that the premium would be due if the
prepayment was voluntary or involuntary.171 The court held that the
prepayment must actually take place under the terms of the contract
in order for the make-whole premium to be triggered.172 Because
this claim was for contingent interest that was not due at the petition
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date, an undersecured creditor will not be able to claim such
amount.173
Recently, in Hyde Park, the court held that a yield maintenance
make-whole provision was correctly construed as unmatured interest.174 Here, the debtor borrowed approximately $50 million secured
by the hospital’s real estate.175 The court first held that the premium
was not an unenforceable penalty.176 The court then went on to hold
that the premium was unmatured interest.177 The court reasoned that
the premium was unmatured at the time of the petition because the
premium was triggered three months after the petition date by an
acceleration of the loan due to a default.178 While the loan agreement
did not define “interest,” the court found that the economic substance of the premium was indeed interest because it accelerated the
interest on the loan that had not been accrued and made it all due
immediately.179 The court compared the premium to an original issue discount, which courts have determined is definitely interest.180
The court also held that a premium can be a valid liquidated damages claim and still be disallowed as unmatured interest.181 Hyde
Park illustrates that post-petition claims for a prepayment premium
will have a harder time getting around the Code’s prohibition on unmatured interest.
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A. Analysis of the Applicability of Section 502(b)(2) to MakeWhole Provisions
Some scholars argue that oversecured creditors that have a claim
under section 506(b) are not subject to section 502(b)(2)’s prohibition on unmatured interest.182 However, this should not be the case.
Section 506(a)(1) says that “an allowed claim of a creditor secured
by a lien . . . is a secured claim.”183 Section 502 tells us what an
“allowed claim” is, and section 502(b) excludes unmatured interest. Therefore, if a prepayment penalty is construed as unmatured
interest, then it should not be allowed under section 502. And if it’s
not allowed under section 502, then it’s not a secured claim for an
oversecured creditor. If the creditor is undersecured, it does not fall
under section 506(b)’s protection and will not be able to collect on
a prepayment fee anyway.
These discrepancies present a substance versus form argument
of whether section 502(b) should apply to make-whole premiums at
all. The Code does not define unmatured interest. Case law has defined unmatured interest as “interest that is not yet due and payable
at the time of a bankruptcy filing, or is not yet earned.”184 One can
argue that a prepayment fee is a charge that looks nothing like interest in form.185 This argument is easier to make when the fee is a flat
rate or a fixed percentage of the outstanding loan. When the fee is
based on a yield maintenance formula, it looks much more like interest.186 On the substance side, it can be argued that one should not
be able to get around section 502(b)(2) by calling unmatured interest
a make-whole provision.187 A yield maintenance make-whole provision is usually a complex formula that approximates the present
value of all unmatured interest at the time of default.
Section 502(b)(2) should stop make-wholes that are triggered
once in bankruptcy where the loans are clearly not matured on the
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petition date. Make-wholes should be allowed when the debt is accelerated prior to bankruptcy and the provision has been triggered.
The real question that courts need to decide definitively is whether
section 502(b)(2) is a block to make-wholes when the acceleration
is automatic due to a bankruptcy filing. It is hard to say with a
straight face that the present value of all unmatured interest payments is not unmatured interest under 502(b)(2). However, the majority of courts have accepted the argument that nothing is still unmatured when the debt is automatically accelerated due to a bankruptcy filing.
The imposition of yield maintenance type prepayment fees is a
preferable lending policy. These are more likely to be accepted under state liquidated damages analysis, as mentioned in Part II.188
Courts have been reluctant to follow the minority view of disallowing premiums because they are unmatured interest. Therefore, overall, the make-whole is more likely to be enforced if a yield maintenance type fee is implemented.
IV. SOLVENT SITUATIONS
Many relevant assumptions in insolvent cases, such as the bankruptcy court’s goal of equitable distribution, do not apply in solvent
cases.189 In insolvent cases, the bankruptcy court must use its discretion in order to fairly distribute assets to creditors.190 It would not
be equitable to allow one creditor to impose a massive prepayment
premium or collect interest when the other creditors are not going to
get their principle back.191 If the proverbial pie is big enough to satisfy all creditors, then any prepayment provision that is enforced in
full does not serve to injure other creditors of the estate.192 While it
is the exceptional situation that a debtor is solvent in bankruptcy,
some scholars argue that undersecured and unsecured creditors
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should also be allowed to collect interest notwithstanding section
502(b)(2).193
Recently, in Energy Future Holdings, the court allowed discovery to determine whether the debtor was solvent.194 The court stated
that “even in bankruptcy, a solvent debtor cannot escape its contractual obligations, but an insolvent debtor may rely on equitable principles to argue [that] the premium should be reduced or not paid.”195
If the debtors were solvent, then the provisions of the contract would
be strictly enforced under the applicable state law.196
If an agreement contains a no-call provision, but does not expressly provide for damages upon breach of the no-call, then courts
have held that there is not a secured claim because the damages were
not provided for under the agreement.197 However, there may be unsecured claims. Also, the lender may have a claim for common law
damages even if all prepayment premiums are inapplicable due to
acceleration.198 Courts will allow damages from a breach of a nocall only in solvent scenarios. As shown in MPM Silicones, the
lender’s claim for damages from a breach of a no-call provision in
an insolvent scenario was rejected as unmatured interest.199
Chemtura may have laid some much needed groundwork in interpreting make-whole and no-call provisions. In Chemtura, there
were two sets of notes with maturity dates of 2016 and 2026.200 The
2016 notes contained a make-whole provision, and the 2026 notes
contained a no-call provision.201 The settlement, under the plan of
reorganization in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, proposed an allowed claim
of 50 million dollars under the make-whole provision to the holders
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of the 2016 notes.202 The equity committee challenged the reasonableness of this settlement because the allowed claim was 42% of the
make-whole provision and 39% of the no-call provision if the provisions were found enforceable. 203 It is to be noted that the court
was not deciding the issues on the merits, but simply whether or not
the settlement reached the level of reasonableness required by the
Bankruptcy Code.204
The court suggested that a two-prong test to determine the enforceability of these provisions was necessary.205 First, the court
would determine whether or not the provision was triggered under
the agreement and whether or not this was an enforceable state law
claim, which includes calculating the amount due in order to determine if it is a penalty.206 The indenture document’s make-whole provisions did not address whether or not a premium was triggered due
to an automatic acceleration under a bankruptcy filing.207 The indenture with the maturity date in 2016 contained separate definitions
of “maturity” and “maturity date.”208 The court concluded that the
acceleration only affected “maturity.”209 Therefore, the “maturity
date” was never changed and the prepayment occurred before the
“maturity date,” which triggered the prepayment premium.210 The
court also stated that the yield maintenance formula would require
more investigation to determine if it was a disallowable penalty.211
Nevertheless, the court noted that it would be reluctant to disallow
the provision because sophisticated parties negotiated the contract.212
Second, if the provision were enforceable under state law, the
court would have to determine if the special considerations in the
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Bankruptcy Code would also allow the claim.213 These special considerations are whether or not section 502(b)(2) or 506(b) require
disallowance or reduction of the claim.214 The court stated that section 502(b)(2) should only apply to situations where the debtor was
insolvent, which was not the case here.215
It is helpful to discuss the two prongs of this proposed test in the
context of other relevant cases. The Chemtura court discussed multiple recent decisions in order to reach its conclusion that the settlement was reasonable.216 In Calpine, the debtors filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on December 5, 2005.217 Prior to the petition date, one
of Calpine’s subsidiaries entered into a series of three lien financings
for approximately 2.6 billion.218 The debtors filed a motion to seek
financing in order to, among other things, repay the subsidiary’s
debt.219 The refinancing would replace high interest rate debt with
low interest rate debt, and this would save the company around 100
million.220 Calpine subsidiary’s secured lenders raised objections arguing that they were entitled to make-whole premiums.221 Six of the
seven tranches of the debt had no-call provisions.222 The court cited
many cases illustrating that, although no-call provisions are generally enforced outside of bankruptcy, upholding no-call provisions in
bankruptcy would defeat the goal of equitable reorganization.223
“The essence of bankruptcy reorganization is to restructure debt . . .
and adjust debtor-creditor relationships.”224 All of the loan agreements did say that filing for bankruptcy was an event of default that
would automatically accelerate the debt.225 However, the agreement
213
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Ryan M. Murphy, Great Expectations: Chemtura Revisits the Treatment of
“Make-Whole” and “No-Call” Provisions Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, Art. 6, 881 (December 2011).
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did not provide for damages upon this acceleration.226 The court
held that the breach of the no-call provisions did not allow for the
right to enforce make-whole provisions.227 Also, the court held that
the breach did not entitle the lender to secured claims, but the lender
would have an unsecured claim for their expectation damages in an
amount equal to that of a make-whole provision.228
However, on appeal in district court, the court disallowed the
unsecured claim for expectation damages because the indentures did
not provide for such damages upon acceleration.229 The court reasoned that if the no-call provisions were unenforceable, then one
could not incur liability for breaching them.230 The court also held
that the claim is disallowed under section 502(b)(2) because the interest had not matured as of the petition date.231
The Solutia232 court agreed with the district court in Calpine.
This court chose not to give damages for a breach of a no-call provision.233 The court reasoned that there was no prepayment because
the notes had matured under the contract through automatic acceleration at the petition date.234 If the notes were considered mature, then
there could not be a prepayment.235 Because there was no prepayment, the no-call provision had not been breached.236 The court in
Solutia opined that the automatic acceleration provision shows the
intent of the lenders “to give up their future income stream in favor
of having an immediate right to collect their entire debt.”237 The
Chemtura court disagreed, stating that there would be situations in

226

Id.
Id. at 399.
228
Id. at 399–00.
229
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which damages for a breach of a no-call provision would be enforceable.238
Premier Entertainment also disagreed with the district court’s
analysis in Calpine. In Premier Entertainment, section 6.02 of the
indenture said that if there was an event of default before February
1, 2008, with the intention of avoiding the no-call provisions, then a
prepayment premium would be due.239 The creditors argued that the
default was willful and that the default was done with the intention
of avoiding the no-call provision.240 The court found in favor of the
debtors.241 The premium was not triggered because the debtors offered sufficient evidence that they filed for bankruptcy in order to
obtain insurance proceeds.242 The claimants were not able to meet
their burden of showing the debtors’ requisite intent.243 The court
found that there was no secured claim under section 506(b) because
the automatic acceleration provision made the prepayment provision
inapplicable.244 However, the court did hold that the breach of the
no-call provision would give rise to an unsecured claim when the
debtor is solvent.245 The court reasoned that the lender is not precluded from a monetary remedy just because specific performance
is not allowed with respect to a no-call in bankruptcy.246 The
Chemtura court agreed with this analysis of no-call provisions in
bankruptcy when the debtor is solvent.247
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A. Bankruptcy Limitations Are Not Applicable When the Debtor
Is Solvent
As evidenced by the above examples, most scholars and courts
agree that bankruptcy limitations regarding make-whole provisions
should be lifted in situations in which the debtor is solvent. The limitations should be lifted because there will be no harm done to any
other creditors in a situation where everyone can be paid. Therefore,
only state law considerations should apply when the debtor is solvent. The Chemtura courts’s two-pronged analysis is a great framework by which to analyze the enforceability of make-whole and nocall provisions in bankruptcy. The lender in Chemtura was successful because the court confirmed its claims as reasonable, but this was
largely due to the fact that the debtor was solvent. The court noted
that it would likely have held the minority view of disallowing defeasance fees as unmatured interest in insolvent cases.248 Lenders
should take notice of this decision because if section 502(b)(2)’s
prohibition on unmatured interest becomes the majority view, makewhole and no-call provisions could become useless in bankruptcy.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The easiest way for a lender to secure enforcement of a makewhole provision is to make sure the agreement is finely drafted so
that it will be triggered after a bankruptcy filing. AMR Corp. and
Solutia have confirmed that courts will consider payment after acceleration as repayment and not prepayment, absent contractual language to the contrary.249 Lenders should make sure that the premium
is due in the event of automatic acceleration and voluntary prepayment. Alternatively, the lender could require a prepayment fee
whenever a debtor repays prior to the original maturity date.250
Lenders need to make sure there are no exceptions to a make-whole
248
249

Murphy, supra note 214, at 888.
See supra Parts II and IV.

250
Mark A. Salzberg & Peter R. Morrison, Rejecting Market-Based
Cramdown Interest Rates, and Making Words Count for Make-Whole Payments,
33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 52, 114–15 (Dec. 2014). This type of provision was used
in Chemtura.

1030

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:998

premium, like the one found in AMR Corp.251 Savvy lenders will
also include an explicit statement that damages are due when a nocall provision is breached. Specifying details about when damages
are due gives the lenders a better chance to recover on a no-call in a
solvent situation. Drafting issues should become a non-issue if lenders are paying close attention to these rulings.252 If agreements are
already in place, then the lender should use any leverage it has to
amend the agreement with unambiguous language.253
Based on the recent case law, it is best for lenders to include
yield maintenance type make-whole provisions, instead of fixed
fees. Yield maintenance provisions have a much better chance of
being enforceable under state law because they actually attempt to
approximate damages.254 While yield maintenance formulas are
more likely to be seen as unmatured interest than a fixed fee, the
majority view, as of now, is that make-whole provisions are not unmatured interest. Plus, debtor-creditor relationships will not always
end up in bankruptcy. While lenders should always prepare for the
worst-case scenario, it is more important that the premiums are enforceable under state law because that is usually the first inquiry.
This analysis can change, however, if the minority view with respect
to unmatured interest becomes the majority view, and courts may be
leaning that way, as shown in Chemtura and MCM Silicones.
The enforceability of make-whole provisions raises some interesting legal arguments. Article Nine of the U.C.C. allows for nonadvances, such as interest and attorney’s fees, and future advances,
in some circumstances, to share the same priority as the original debt
under a security agreement.255 Having the same priority as the original debt means that the later incurred non-advances and future advances will have priority relating back to the time the security interest was first perfected. Non-advances will have an easier time relating back to the original perfection date because future advances are
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subject to knowledge, buyer in the ordinary course, and other stipulations that may prevent relation back. Therefore, it can be argued
that prepayments should also share the same priority as non-advances under Article Nine. Prepayments look more like non-advances than future advances. In a typical future advance, the lender
extends more money to the debtor, which is secured under the original agreement. This is not the case with prepayments, which look
more like a charge or the present value of the interest outstanding.
Prepayments, just like attorney’s fees, must be provided for under
the agreement in order to be enforceable or permitted. Both attorney’s fees and prepayments are negotiated for with an eye on the
possibility of default and bankruptcy, and the resulting issues that
will arise.
Future expectation damages are usually allowed under the Code,
but they are not with respect to interest.256 Under common law, a
creditor is entitled to damages for a breach of a no-call provision,
just like any other type of breach.257 Under contract law, an aggrieved party “is entitled to all damages proximately caused by the
breach if the damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time of
contracting, they were unavoidable, and the aggrieved party can
prove them with a reasonable degree of certainty.”258 Therefore, a
creditor should be entitled to damages for a breach of a no-call provision if it meets the contract law stipulations even in insolvent situations. However, most courts have held that the legislative intent
of section 502(b)(2) was to disallow future interest expectation damages.259
There is a looming policy question of whether make-whole provisions are beneficial overall. These rulings are a mixed bag as discussed previously. Some are encouraging lending by providing certainty because bargained for provisions are being upheld inside and
outside of bankruptcy. Others are making lenders much more skeptical about disbursing funds because the lenders are unsure if they
will receive their full expectation damages if the debtor’s business
results in bankruptcy. This type of uncertainty is a large problem
256
257
258
259
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going forward and one that needs to be resolved. Most people should
agree that encouraging lending is a good thing because it increases
the flow and availability of money, which strengthens the economy.
However, secured lenders can hurt other types of creditors if makewhole provisions are enforced.
Once the debtor is in bankruptcy, the trustee is in control of the
estate and any money that is distributed to a secured creditor will
come out of the pocket of other unsecured creditors.260 Even if two
sophisticated parties negotiated the original agreement, if the secured party receives the benefit of a make-whole provision in bankruptcy, the secured creditor will be taking money away from the estate and other unsecured creditors who may be unsophisticated.
These unsecured creditors did not have a say in the negotiations of
the loan agreement, but their distributions under the Bankruptcy
Code are being affected by a private agreement. Therefore, there is
a question of whether two parties should be able to privately contract
around a public law that sets forth how distributions are to be allocated in bankruptcy. In partnership law, parties are able to contract
around the default rules as long as it is explicitly stated in the operating agreement. So should the same be true of the Code? The Code
is not a set of default rules that are only followed if the loan agreement does not address an issue. However, make-whole clauses operate within the confines of the Code’s restrictions.
It is most appropriate that a party is given what it bargained for
if it is within the rules of the Code. Unsecured creditors should know
the rules of the game and realize the risks they are taking by lending
on an unsecured basis. It can be argued that secured creditors should
contemplate that a debtor can declare bankruptcy, which is well
within debtor’s rights as determined by congress, and this displaces
certain parts of the loan agreement. However, value should not be
reallocated from secured creditors to unsecured creditors when a
make-whole provision is otherwise enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code just because one group has been injured. While there is
a good argument that secured creditors have found a loophole in the
Code to get around unmatured interest,261 the majority of courts
have not seen it this way, and therefore, secured creditors should not
260
261
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be punished for working within the Code. Another example of a
workaround in the Code is the allowance of the payment of “performance bonuses” when retention bonuses are not allowed.262 This is
very similar to the allowance of a yield maintenance make-whole
provision when unmatured interest is prohibited. By not enforcing
make-whole provisions, courts would be giving the other creditors
of the estate a backdoor way out of the original agreement the debtor
had with the secured creditor.
It is true that there are contract provisions that will not be enforced in bankruptcy, such as a blanket default provision giving a
secured creditor collateral in all of the debtor’s property. Legislatures do not want to allow these types of provisions because they
could easily be put into every lending agreement and bargaining
power will not be equal in all circumstances. A blanket default provision would greatly reduce a debtor’s ability to finance anything
else after a default because it could no longer give first position in
its collateral. A make-whole provision is not the type of provision
that should be invalidated because it does not have the same concerns. In fact, make-whole clauses may give a debtor a better opportunity to finance their business because the debtor can chose to opt
out of a loan agreement after payment of a fee if there are possible
savings to be had. Also, a bankruptcy court can use its equity powers
and lessen a make-whole provision, while still rendering it enforceable.
CONCLUSION
In order for a make-whole provision to be enforceable, the provision must be a valid liquidated damages clause under state law, it
must be provided for and triggered under the agreement, and it must
not be tantamount to unmatured interest. Often, a ruling can come
262
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changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 have made retention bonuses for key
employees much more difficult to pay in bankruptcy, debtors have had to guise
the bonuses as performance based incentive plans in order to workaround the
change in the Code).
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down to which party the court feels should prevail.263 Even if the
agreement is perfectly drafted, a court could reject an outcome to
preserve the estate for other creditors using the wiggle room provided for in either a state liquidated damages analysis or a section
506(b) reasonableness analysis.264 Also, most debtors in bankruptcy
are insolvent, so the equities of the case can come into play in order
to partially invalidate a make-whole provision.265 Lenders can improve their chances of having make-whole clauses enforced, but
they can never be certain of all of the risks involved because of the
wiggle provided by the Code and the valid policy arguments discussed in Part V.266
Overall, it is the best policy to enforce make-whole provisions
negotiated between sophisticated parties, unless the result of the provision is unconscionable. While unsecured creditors will suffer in
circumstances where make-whole provisions are enforced, they will
have the ability to more easily obtain financing because lenders will
be more certain of the enforceability of their agreements. The results
of more generous lending will benefit the economy and outweigh
the harm caused to the unsecured creditors in individual cases. The
increased ease of financing is the rising tide that will benefit all parties involved.
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